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INDIAN LAW-INDIAN

SOVEREIGNTY AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER

NON-INDIAN OFFENDERs-Oliphant

v. Schlie, 544 F. 2d 1007 (9th

Cir. 1976).
The question of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians inside the territorial limits of the reservation has remained unanswered since it first
arose in a frontier case in 1878.1 Because no federal statute expressly
confers such jurisdiction upon the tribes, the ability to exercise such
jurisdiction depends upon the extent of the tribes' inherent sovereignty. A fundamental split in theory has arisen between those courts
which believe that the tribes possess all powers of internal sovereignty
not expressly limited by Congress 2 and others which contend that the
tribes possess only those powers conferred upon them by the federal

government.3 In 1975 the United States Supreme Court stated that the
inherent sovereignty of the tribes implies a "certain degree of independent authority over matters that affect the internal and social relations
of tribal life,"' 4 but the Court did not explore the extent of that au-

thority. Recently, in Oliphant v. Schlie,5 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld a tribal court's jurisdiction over a non-Indian
6
defendant for an offense committed on Indian land.
1.

Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7720) (tribe

had no jurisdiction over non-Indian offender). See notes 58-64 and accompanying
text infra.
2. E.g., Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975)
(tribe's inherent sovereignty supports jurisdiction of tribal police officer to investigate
on-reservation violations of state and federal law); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe,
231 F.2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956) (refusing to enjoin tribal enforcement of sentence
imposed on tribal members for the offense of adultery); United States v. LaPlant, 156
F. Supp. 660, 662 (D. Mont. 1957) (forbidding federal prosecution of tribal member
who had already been convicted and fined by tribal court for the offense).
3. E.g., Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy,
J.., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct.
2919 (1977). United States v. Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 364 F. Supp. 192, 194
(D. Mont. 1973) (term "sovereign" as applied to Indian tribes means no more than
"within the will of Congress"). See also Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: Inherent Right or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE
DAME LAWYER 600 (1976).

4. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (upholding congressional
delegation of law enforcement authority to an Indian tribe).

5. 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976). Mark David Oliphant was arrested by Suquamish tribal police on the Port Madison Indian reservation and was charged in tribal
court with assaulting an officer and resisting arrest. He was incarcerated by order of
the tribal court and later released on his own recognizance. Before trial he petitioned
the United States district court for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that a tribal
court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a non-Indian. The district court denied the

writ, and Oliphant appealed.
6.

The federal courts recently have begun to recognize a requirement of ex-
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Oliphant, the first attempt in recent case law to deal directly with

the issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, represents an
acceptance of the theory that tribal sovereignty is diminished only to
the extent that it is expressly limited by the federal government. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, in the absence of
any express limitations on tribal power, the original criminal jurisdiction of the tribe remains undiminished. After establishing this founda-

tional principle, the court proceeded to analyze the alleged limitations
on tribal jurisdiction. First, the court found no treaty purporting to
limit the tribe's criminal jurisdiction. 7 Second, the federal jurisdictional

statute was found to contain no claim of exclusivity. 8 Third, the court
construed the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act 9 as limiting but not extinguishing tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Fourth, state
jurisdiction under Public Law 28010 was found to have been effectively
retroceded. 11 Finally, the court found that tribal criminal jurisdiction

haustion of tribal remedies before intervention by a federal court. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Cobell v. Cobell, 503 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 999 (1975); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1146 (8th
Cir. 1973); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 26 (D. Ariz. 1968). The requirement
is not an inflexible one. The applicability of the exhaustion requirement is to be determined by "weighing the need to preserve the cultural identity of the tribe by
strengthening the authority of the tribal courts, against the need to immediately adjudicate alleged deprivations of individual rights." O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir. 1973). Although the exhaustion requirement
was developed in cases involving federal review of tribal actions under the Indian Bill
of Rights, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1970), the reasoning in those cases is equally
applicable to the Oliphant situation. Because the defendant was no longer in custody,
tribal interests outweighed the deprivation of the defendant's individual rights, and
federal intervention could have been postponed pending resolution of the case in
tribal court.
7. The treaties involved in the case were the Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855,
12 Stat. 927, and the Act of Mar. 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1078.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970). See note 39 infra.
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1970). See notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text
infra.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1970). See notes 46 & 47
and accompanying text infra.
11. In the 1968 Civil Rights Act, the United States was given authority to retake
jurisdiction which had been assumed by the states under Public Law 280 and then
retroceded. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970). The Governor of Washington proclaimed retrocession of jurisdiction over the Suquamish on August 26, 1971. The Secretary of
the Interior effectively accepted the retrocession on April 14, 1972 (37 Fed. Reg.
1353 (1972).
Oliphant claimed that the retrocession was ineffective because invalid under Washington law due to lack of legislative authority for the Governor's proclamation. The
court found the issue to be a question of federal law, and that the acceptance of retrocession by the Secretary of the Interior made it effective regardless of the validity
of the Governor's action under Washington law. 544 F.2d at 1012.
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over non-Indians conformed with the federal policy of encouraging
Indian self-government.

The Oliphant decision stands in marked opposition to a commonly
expressed view that tribal courts cannot validly assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 12 The court's conclusion that the federal
statute is non-exclusive establishes a system of concurrent federal-

tribal jurisdiction which may have a profound effect upon. the law
enforcement situation on Indian land. This note analyzes these issues
in light of the history and nature of tribal sovereignty and concludes

that, because tribal sovereignty is the foundation upon which an ambiguous state or federal jurisdictional statute must be examined, the
result in Oliphant is correct and in accord with current policies encouraging tribal self-determination.
I.

SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY

Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country 13 is presently allocated
among the federal government, the states, and the Indian tribes on the
bases of the race of the offender and victim, the nature of the offense,
14
and the locus of the offense.
A.

TribalSovereignty

Before the arrival of Europeans on this continent, the various Indian tribes were sovereign entities in the sense that they exercised full
12. E.g., Memorandum, Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, 77 Interior
Dec. 113 (Aug. 10, 1970) (withdrawn Jan. 25, 1974); D. Klein, Criminal Jurisdiction
in Indian Country: The Policeman's Dilemma 17, 22 (paper of the National Indian
Justice Planning Ass'n, Inc., 1973); accord, W. BROPHY & S. ABERLE, THE INDIANAMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS 50 (1966); Newman, Jurisdiction over Indians and
Indian Lands in Washington in 1 STUDIES IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 232, 239 (R. John-

son ed. 1970). See also Comment, The "Right of Tribal Self-Government" and Jurisdiction of Indian Affairs, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 291, 298.
13. "Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970):
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1155 and 1156 of this title, the term
"Indian country" as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders
of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
14. For analyses of each possible combination of these factors, see F. COHEN,
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powers of self-government. 1 5 Although it is generally recognized that
the process of conquest destroyed the external sovereignty of the
tribes,1 6 there is disagreement with respect to the effect of conquest
upon the extent of the tribes' internal sovereignty.' 7 Nevertheless, the
concept of inherent tribal sovereignty has been fundamental since its
explicit recognition by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia.'8 Speaking for the Court, the Chief Justice stated that treaties between Indian tribes and the federal government recognize "the

HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 358-65 (1942); Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction over

Indian Country in Arizona, I ARiz. L. REV. 62 (1959); Vollman, Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants' Rights in Conflict, 22
KAN. L. REV. 387 (1974).

15. The concept of sovereignty initially may have been foreign to Indian "stateless" societies in which the structure of command issued from the community as a
whole, but Indian tribes have been forced to adopt the "sovereign" label in order to
preserve their political integrity. McGimpsey, Indian Tribal Sovereignty, in 2 STUDIES IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 1. 4-5 (R. Johnson ed. 1971).
16. In the Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1970), Congress
proclaimed: "Hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty." One international tribunal
has affirmed this view. In the Cayuga Indian Claims case (Great Britain v. United
States), Nielsen Rep. 203, 307 (1926), a claim could not be maintained by the Cayuga
Nation because it was not a legal unit of international law. See 20 AM. J. INT'L. L.
574, 577 (1926).
17. Cohen states that conquest did not alter the tribe's internal sovereignty in the
absence of legislative action: "Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative
power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but
does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its power of selfgovernment." F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 123.
18. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (Georgia had no jurisdiction to regulate who
could live in Indian country). The foremost commentator on Indian law has called
tribal sovereignty "the most basic principle of all Indian law ....
[T] hose powers
which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers
granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished." F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 22.
In the early days of the treaty-making period, the government recognized tribal
sovereignty, providing specific recognition of the tribes' rights to make war (Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek with the Choctaw Nation, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333), to punish
white settlers on their lands (Treaty with the Wiandot. Delaware, Chippewa. and
Ottawa Nations, Jan. 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16), and, in one case, to send a deputy to Congress (Treaty with the Cherokee Nation, Nov. 28, 1785, art. xii. 7 Stat. 18).
Chief Justice Marshall laid the foundation for examination of the scope of tribal
power in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The Cherokee
tribe sought to restrain the state from enforcing its law inside the boundaries of
Cherokee land. Because the tribe was not a foreign state, the Court had no jurisdiction
under article III of the Constitution. In dismissing the bill, Marshall examined
the relationship between the Indian tribes and the federal government. The Court
held that the Indian tribes were not foreign states, but that "they may, more correctly,
perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations.... Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian." 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
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several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive."' 19 Thus,
the treaty at issue in the case did not create any Indian right, but only
20
recognized a pre-existing one.
Since Marshall first articulated the doctrine, courts have repeatedly
reaffirmed the inherent sovereignty of the Indian tribes. They have
held that the tribal right to self-government includes the right to
choose a form of government,2 1 to define conditions of tribal membership,2 2 to regulate domestic relations, 23 to prescribe rules of inheritance,2 4 to levy taxes,2 5 to exclude non-members,2 6 and to administer
justice.2 7 In civil cases, the tribe may assert jurisdiction even though a
non-Indian is a party to the transaction.2 8 Indeed, a growing recogni19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557.
20. 'The very fact of repeated treaties with them- recognizes [the Indian tribes'
title to self-government]; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a
weaker power does not surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by
associating with a stronger, and taking its protection." 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560-61.
21. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (holding that the test for validity
of state jurisdiction in a civil suit is whether the exercise of state jurisdiction infringed
on the tribe's right to make its own laws and be governed by them).
22. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 448 (D.S.D. 1977) (election, called to amend constitution and bylaws of the tribe to require that any enrolled'
member be of at least one-fourth Cheyenne River Sioux Indian blood, was not subject to the 26th amendment, which gives 18-year-olds the right to vote).
23. United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (tribe ietaijied jurisdiction over
offense of adultery committed by Indians on the reservation);Dickhead-v. Anderson,
87 Wn. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976) (tribe has exclusive jurisdiction to determine
if mother, enrolled tribal member, was to retain custody of her child). See also State
ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 57 Wn. 2d 181, 356 P.2d 985 (1960); In re Colwash, 57 Wn. 2d 196, 356 P.2d 994 (1960).
24. Jones v.-Meehan," 175 U.S. 1 (1899) (right of inheritance was determined by
tribal law and custom).
25. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 99 (8th Cir. 1956) (power to
tax a tribal member for the privilege of grazing stock is an inherent attribute of tribal
sovereignty); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed,
203 U.S. 599 (1906) (tribe's right to tax a non-Indian on the reservation is "one of
the inherent and essential attributes of its original sovereignty").
26. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 389 (1904) (right of tribe to control the
presence of intruders had been sanctioned by a federal act); Quechan Tribe of Indians
v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976) (in the absence of treaty provisions or congressional pronouncements to the contrary, tribe has inherent power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation).
27. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975). In that case a
tribal police officer was held to have jurisdiction to investigate violations by a nonIndian of state and federal law on the reservation: "Intrinsic in this sovereignty is the
power of a tribe to create and administer a criminal justice system." Id. at 1179.
28. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (state had no jurisdiction over a suit
by a non-Indian, who owned a store on the reservation, to recover goods sold on
credit to Indians, because the exercise of state jurisdiction would undermine the
authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs).
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tion of the Indian right to self-determination and the expanding ability
of the tribes to enforce law and order on the reservations has given
rise to a noticeable judicial trend toward reinforcement of the sovereignty concept. 29 The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,30 the necessity
for which was generated in part by a recognition that at least some of
the limits in the Bill of Rights do not apply to tribal courts, 3 1 mani32
fests a congressional reaffirmation of tribal sovereignty.
The Oliphant court's analysis of the problem of tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians is illustrative of the trend toward recognition of
tribal sovereignty. The court noted that the tribe had complete jurisdiction before it was conquered, as does any independent nation.
Thus, the relevant question is not whether Congress has conferred
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but whether a treaty or
congressional act has expressly removed such jurisdiction from the
29. See, e.g., Long v. Quinault Tribe, No. C 75-677 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 2, 1975).
(non-Indian must exhaust his tribal remedies before a federal court will interfere);
Belgarde v. Morton, No. C 74-683 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 1975) cert. granted sub
norn. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977) (tribal court has
jurisdiction over non-Indian committing an offense on a state highway on an Indian
reservation); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd,
520 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (tribe may, under
certain circumstances, regulate members' treaty-based right to fish outside the reservation boundaries); Duckhead v. Anderson, 87 Wn. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976)
(a tribal court retains jurisdiction to determine custody of an Indian child placed in a
foster home outside the reservation).
30. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1970).
3 I. Before the 1968 legislation, the Supreme Court had held that some guarantees
in the Bill of Rights did not apply to tribal governments. See Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376 (1896) (fifth amendment did not apply to local legislation by the Cherokee nation); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th
Cir. 1959). The Indian Civil Rights Act resolved the problem by extending some, but
not all of the restrictions in the Bill of Rights to tribal courts. The Act contains
modified versions of the first, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments
and limits penalties to six months imprisonment and/or a $500 fine for any single
offense. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970). The scope of the rights afforded by the Act may
not be coextensive with the established legal meaning of the Bill of Rights; the scope
is to be determined by balancing the individual right against the tribe's legitimate
interest in maintaining its traditional values and cultural integrity. Janis v. Wilson,
385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974) (termination of tribal government employees for
engaging in political demonstrations during working hours was not a violation of the
Indian Civil Rights Act); cf. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039
(10th Cir. 1976) (when tribal ordinance was challenged on equal protection grounds,
the court used a balancing approach but applied a strict standard of review by requiring that the tribe's interest be "compelling").
32. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974). aff'd, 520
F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (tribe could regulate
the treaty fishing rights of its members without state regulation if tribe complied with
certain conditions). "There was a period during which Congress enacted legislation
limiting the exercise of tribal autonomy in various particulars. However, in the last
decade, Congressional legislation has definitely been in the contrary direction, notably
in the so-called Indian Civil Rights Act." Id. at 340.

994

Tribal Jurisdiction
tribe.33 The court declared that Indian tribes, "though conquered and
dependent, retain those powers of autonomous states that are neither
34
inconsistent with their status nor expressly terminated by Congress.
B.

Federaland State Power

Federal power over Indian affairs is based primarily on the commerce clause, 35 although it has also been sustained on the grounds of

federal land ownership3 6 and the government's "guardian-ward" relationship with the Indian tribes. 37 Whatever the source, federal power
over Indian affairs has proved to be so extensive that it may properly
'38
be characterized as "plenary.
The federal government has not chosen to exercise the full extent of
its power by enacting a comprehensive criminal code for Indian

country. Statutory authority for federal prosecution of crimes on Indian land has been established by 18 U.S.C. § 1152,3 9 which incorpo33. 544 F.2d at 1009 n.1.
34. Id.
35. "Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, §
8, cl.3. Congress has exercised broad powers over Indian tribes under the commerce
clause, beginning in 1790 with a series of Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts
which were the forerunners of the modern federal criminal jurisdiction statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1f52 (1970). See Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729; Act of Mar.
30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469; Act of July
22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137.
The Supreme Court has held that the commerce clause provides constitutional
authority for federal criminal jurisdiction. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (2
Wall.) 407 (1866) (commerce clause sufficient to sustain criminal jurisdiction in
case involving a commercial transaction); United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567
(1846) (commerce clause a valid basis for jurisdiction over crime of murder on
Indian land). The Court, however, later suggested that only a "very strained construction" of the commerce clause supports the assertion of criminal jurisdiction.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886).
36. Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240 (1823)
(title to Indian land is in the United States, the tribes have only an exclusive right of
occupancy, and a land patent granted by the Cherokee Nation was therefore invalid).
37. United States v. Thomas, 151 U.S. 577 (1894); United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375 (1886).
38. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902) (Secretary of Interior
had authority to lease Indian oil lands); F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 90.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970) states:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of Columbia,
shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any
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rates both federal enclave law 40 and the Assimilative Crimes Act 4 '
into the body of generally applicable federal law. 42 Section 1152 creates an exception to federal jurisdiction for crimes committed by an
Indian against another Indian; 43 however, the Major Crimes Act of
188544 gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving only Inoffense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over
such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
40. Federal enclave law consists of "those laws passed by the federal government
in the exercise of its police powers over federal property and now defined in the
United States Criminal Code in terms of 'special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States,' 18 U.S.C. § 7." United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 454-55
(8th Cir. 1974).
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13 (1970). Section 13 provides:
Whoever within or upon any of the places now existing or hereafter reserved or
acquired as provided in section 7 of this title, is guilty of any act or omission
which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be
punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the State, Territory,
Possession or District in which such place is situated, by the laws thereof in force
at the time of such act or omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and subject
to a like punishment.
The Assimilative Crimes Act has been held applicable to Indian country. See Williams
v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1945); United States v. Sosseur. 181 F.2d 173 (7th
Cir. 1950).
42. Federal law makes some acts federal crimes regardless of where committed.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970) (federal kidnaping act).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970).
44. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385, as amended by Act of
May 29, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-297, § 2, 90 Stat. 585 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153
(West Supp. 1977)). The Act provides:
Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, who has not attained
the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape. incest, assault with
intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon. assault resulting in
serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian
country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
As used in this section, the offenses of burglary and incest shall be defined
and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense
was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.
In addition to the offenses of burglary and incest, any other of the above offenses which are not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in
force at the time of such offense.
The statute was enacted in 1885 as a result of adverse reaction to the Supreme
Court's decision in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), in which the Court
interpreted § 1152 as leaving undisturbed the tribes' exclusive jurisdiction over otfenses involving Indians only. In that case, the Court held that a federal court has
no jurisdiction over the crime of murder committed by one Indian against another
in Indian country, in the absence of express legislation.
The legislative history reveals the indignation generated by the decision:
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dians if the offense is one of fourteen enumerated felonies. All other
crimes involving only Indians, however, remain subject to exclusive
45
tribal jurisdiction.
Congress again exercised its plenary power in 1953 with the passage of Public Law 280,46 which gave five states criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country within their borders47 and allowed other states to
assume criminal and civil jurisdiction without tribal consent.48 Enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 196849 again altered jurisdiction. It amended Public Law 280 by making future assumptions of
jurisdiction by the states conditional upon the consent of the affected
tribe, providing procedures for retrocession of jurisdiction,5 0 and extending certain due process requirements to tribal courts. 51
These federal statutes establish both the limits of the federal government's exercise of its plenary power and the extent to which the
tribes remain sovereign powers. It was established early that, in the
absence of federal provision for state jurisdiction, state laws have no
It is ai infamy upon our civilization, a disgrace to this nation, that there should
be anywhere within its boundaries a body of people who can, with absolute impunity, commit the crime of murder, there being no tribunal before which they
can be brought for punishment.
16 CONG. REC. (pt. II) 934 (1885) (remarks of Rep. Cutcheon).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970). See note 44 supra. Crimes under general federal
law remain, of course, under federal jurisdiction. See note 42 supra.
46. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 588 (current version at 18 U.S.C.§ 1162 (1970) and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1970)).
47. The five states given authority to assume jurisdiction are California, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970). Alaska was added later.
Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615,72 Stat. 545.
It is not clear whether state jurisdiction under Public Law 280 is exclusive. That
issue will be decided in a companion case to Oliphant. See Belgarde v. Morton, No.
C 74-683 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 1975) cert. granted sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977) (Suquamish tribe had jurisdiction over the
offense of reckless driving committed on a state highway within the reservation). But
see 63-64 Op. WASH. ATr'y GEN. No. 68 (Nov. 8, 1963) (concluding that state
jurisdiction under Public Law 280 is exclusive).
48. Under the provisions of Public Law 280, the State of Washington passed a
statute assuming full jurisdiction over concenting tribes. As to unconsenting tribes, the
state assumed full jurisdiction with respect to fee land, but jurisdiction on non-free lands
only with regard to eight subject matter categories: compulsory school attendance,
public assistance, domestic relations, mental illness, juvenile delinquency, adoption
proceedings, dependent children, and operation of motor vehicles on public thoroughares. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (1976). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held this partial assumption of jurisdiction based on land title classification unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. Confederated
Bands of the Yakima Nation v. Washington, 555 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1977).
49. 25 U.S.C. 99 1301-1341 (1970).
50. The United States was given authority to retake jurisdiction which was assumed
by the states under Public Law 280. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970).
51. See note 31 supra.
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effect in Indian territory. 52 The language of the Oliphant court demonstrates that this basic policy has endured: "[I] f the crime is by or
against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on
other courts by Congress has remained exclusive." 53 When a non-Indian is the offender or victim, a limited exercise of state jurisdiction
54
has been allowed.
Thus, the basic principles of the jurisdictional scheme are: (1) Indian tribes originally possessed all powers of sovereignty; (2) conquest
destroyed the tribes' powers of external sovereignty and rendered
them subject to the legislative power of the United States; (3) the
tribes retain full powers of internal sovereignty except as qualified by
treaties or express federal legislation.
II.

TRIBAL JURISDICTION: PERSONAL OR TERRITORIAL?

A.

The Nature of Tribal Jurisdiction

Tribal criminal jurisdiction has often been viewed as "personal,"
extending only to Indians. In 1970 the Solicitor of the Department of
the Interior issued an opinion 5 5 on the question of tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians which concluded that "Indian tribes do not possess
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, such jurisdiction lies in either
the state or federal governments." 56 This report, recently replaced by
an opinion favoring tribal jurisdiction,5 7 was illustrative of a policy
that has consistently limited the exercise of tribal sovereignty in the
past.
There is a dearth of authority supporting such a limitation on tribal
jurisdiction. The only clear case law on the subject is found in Ex
parte Kenyon,5 8 an 1878 circuit court decision. Although commission
of the particular crime outside the territorial boundaries of the reser52. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
53. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1010 (1976) cert. granted sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
54. See Part 1I-B infra.
55. 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970).
56. Id. at 115.
57. Memorandum to Deputy Solicitor from Morris Thompson, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs (Sept. 3, 1976), reprinted in 3 INDIAN LAW REP. i-8-i-10 (1976).
58. 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7720) (tribe had no jurisdiction
over the crime of larceny committed by a non-Indian outside the boundaries of the
reservation).
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vation was the deciding factor in the case, 59 the court stated in dicta
that tribal jursidiction is limited to offenses in which both the offender
and victim are Indian.6 0 The court, however, relied on an earlier version of 18 U.S.C. § 1152,61 which did not expressly declare the
exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over Indian country. 62 Moreover,
the court's position in Kenyon-that tribal jurisdiction extends only to
intra-Indian crimes-is discredited by section 1152's implicit authorzation of concurrent federal-tribal jurisdiction over offenses by an
Indian against a non-Indian on the reservation. 63 The Oliphantcourt,
expressly disapproving the dicta in Kenyon, found that the extension
of federal jurisdiction in section 1152 was best explained as a protection for the tribes from unsympathetic state governments, not as an
64
attempt to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction.
59. The court in Kenyon said of the fact that the crime had occurred off the reservation, "This alone would be conclusive of the case." Id. at 355. The personal limitation on tribal jurisdiction could be considered as an alternate holding; the Supreme
Court, however, construed it as dictum in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 108 (1884),
and stated that the extra-territorial nature of the crime was the conclusive factor in
Kenyon.
60. The court concluded:
[I]f there was any crime committed, at any time, it was committed not only beyond the place over which the Indian court had jurisdiction, but, at the tfme it
was committed, by one over whose person such court did not have jurisdiction,
because, to give this court jurisdiction of the person of an offender, such offender must be an Indian, and the one against whom the offense is committed must
also be an Indian.
14 F. Cas. at 355. The dictum in Kenyon was accepted and republished by Felix Cohen,
the foremost commentator on Indian law. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 360. As the
Oliphant court noted, Cohen's statement is no more authoritative than its source, although the stature of his treatise has given the dictum substantial force. 544 F.2d 1007,
1011 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976). His view that tribal criminal jurisdiction is personal in
nature is inconsistent with his own formula for determining the content of tribal
sovereignty: "What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty." F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 122.
61. Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353, 355 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7720) The
court relied on the language of the Act of Dec. 1, 1873, ch. 4, 28 Rev. Stat. § 2146,
18 Stat. 376 (1873) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970)).
62. One commentator has suggested that the widespread belief that tribal jurisdiction is limited to Indians may be attributable to a confusion between tribal courts and
Indian Courts of Claims, which derive their authority from the federal government
and function 'as agencies of the United States. The Indian Courts of Claims administer justice under the authority of the Department of the Interior, and can exercise
jurisdiction over non-Indians only if they consent. 25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1973). See
Note, Indian Tribal Courts, 18 ST. Louis U.LJ. 461, 463-64 (1973).
63. The statute provides that if the tribe has already punished the offender, he
may not be retried in federal court. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1970). See note 39 supra. Since
wholly intra-Indian crimes are excepted from federal jurisdiction in a separate clause,
the double jeopardy clause would be meaningless unless it refers to crimes by Indians
against non-Indians.
64. 544F.2dat 1010-11.
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States' Jurisdictionover Non-Indians Within Indian Country
The personal jurisdiction limitation of Kenyon has implied support

from a line of cases based upon two Supreme Court decisionsUnited States v. McBratney65 and Draper v. United States.66 These
cases indicate that a state, rather than the federal government, has jur-

isdiction over an offense on the reservation committed by a non-Indian against a non-Indian victim. The reasoning in these cases is inconsistent with the requirement of express withdrawal of tribal power
advanced by the court in Oliphant. The Supreme Court in each case
held that, even though no federal statute had conferred jurisdiction
upon the states, they had jurisdiction by virtue of their sovereignty

over the territory within the state boundaries. 67 These holdings create
problems for the Oliphant court's equation of inherent sovereignty
68
and territorial jurisdiction.
Traditional common law views of sovereignty and criminal jurisdic69
tion, however, support the theory that tribal jurisdiction is territorial.
Analogical support may also be found in international law, where
the rationale for territorial criminal jurisdiction is that crimes should
be dealt with by the government whose social order is most clearly
affected.7 0 Felix Cohen cautioned against reading the common law
principle of territoriality into tribal law. 7 1 He noted that exceptions to
the doctrine of territoriality include the power of the federal govern-

104 U.S. 621 (1881).
65.
66. 164 U.S. 240 (1896). See also People ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496
(1946). In each of these cases, the Court held that the individual state had jurisdiction
over the crime of murder of a non-Indian by a non-Indian on the reservation.
67. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 247 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 623-24 (1881).
68. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 (1976) cert. granted sub nom.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977). See text accompanying
notes 8-9 supra.
69. See, e.g., 1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 17 (1974) ("Traditionally, at least under the common law, jurisdiction to subject an accused to prosecution resides in the courts of the state or county in which the crime was committed."); CLARK & MARSHALL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 3.00 (7th ed. 1967).
70. One commentator stated:
The territoriality of criminal jurisdiction is founded on various principles. Its
normal justification is that, as a matter of convenience, crimes should be dealt
with by the States whose social order is most closely affected, and in general this
will be the State on whose territory the crimes are committed.
J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (7th ed. 1972) (footnote omitted). See also W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 343, 444 (1962).
71. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 360.
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ment to punish citizens for offenses committed abroad, federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs off the reservation, federal jurisdiction
over United States citizens in "uncivilized countries," and the broad
geographical jurisdiction of courts in civil cases.7 2 These exceptions,
however, are all extensions of jurisdiction to extra-territorial acts; they
do not lend support to an extra-territorial jurisdictional limitation
based on racial classification. The unique position of the Indian
tribes, as quasi-sovereigns in a federalist system, requires that a determination of their status be made essentially by rules that are sui generis.
Several criticisms can be made of McBratney, Draper, and their
successors. First, they represent judicial disregard of the principle established in Worcester that, at least so far as the power of the states is
involved, the tribes have "territorial boundaries, within which their
authority is exclusive."' 73 Second, the McBratney-Draperrule is inconsistent with the accepted view that the original sovereignty of the
tribes remains undiminished to the extent that it has not been ex74
pressly limited by the acts of the superior government.
Finally, the rule is in apparent conflict with the language of section
1152, which ostensibly extends federal jurisdiction to all offenses
committed in Indian country, the only exceptions being those instances where the tribes have exclusive jurisdiction. 75 The Court's disregard of that clear language, which should give federal courts at least
concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indian offenses, and its emphasis on
state sovereignty, implies that Congress lacks the power to create federal jurisdiction over non-Indian crimes.7 6 Such a view seems threatened by the supremacy clause 77 and the trend toward expansion of the
role of federal preemption in the field of Indian jurisdiction.7 8 The
72. Id.
73. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 517 (1832).
74. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 146; notes 2, 32 & 33 and accompanying text
supra.
75. The Supreme Court has recently recognized the broad language of the statute,
but noted that "the respondents correctly argued that, had the perpetrators of the

crimes been non-Indians, the courts of Idaho would have had jurisdiction over these
charges." United States v. Antelope, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1397 n.4 (1977) (rejecting an
equal protection challenge to federal convictions of Indians under the Major Crimes
Act).
76. Clinton, Criminal Jurisdictionover Indian Lands: A Journey through a JurisdictionalMaze, 18 Aiuz. L. REV. 503, 526 n.103 (1976).
2.
77. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
78. See notes 29-34 and accompanying text supra.
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McBratney-Draperrule could also be undermined if the "infringement
test," which has developed in civil cases, 79 were to be applied to pre-

clude state jurisdiction over crimes involving only non-Indians. In at
least one case, the Court has declined to follow the rule. In Pickett v.
United States, 80 the Court found that federal jurisdiction under section 1152 extended to the murder of one black by another black on

the reservation. The crime occurred in a territory rather than a state;
therefore, the case is not in direct conflict with McBratney-Draper.
That case does, however, imply that section 1152 authorizes federal

jurisdiction over crimes involving only non-Indians. The validity of
the McBratney-Draperrule should be reexamined in light of estab-

lished principles of Indian law and current government policy recog81
nizing the Indian right to self-determination.
C.

FederalPreemption and Indian Tribal Jurisdiction

Jurisdictional standards established in civil cases shed little light on
the nature of tribal criminal jurisdiction. 82 Nevertheless, the dissent in
Oliphant relied on the "preemption theory" of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,83 a civil case, to reconcile the Worcester
decision with a personal limitation on tribal jurisdiction. 84 The dissenting judge argued that territorial jurisdiction should not be inferred
from inherent tribal sovereignty, because the Supreme Court in McClanahan had discovered a "trend . . .away from the idea of in-

79. See notes 93-95 and accompanying text infra.
80. 216U.S.456(1910).
81. See H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (message from Pres.
Nixon to Congress on Indian Affairs, introducing a legislative package transferring
many functions from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to tribal governments); Memorandum to Deputy Solicitor, supra note 57.
82. The territorial nature of tribal jurisdiction recently has been upheld in a case
involving both civil and criminal elements. A tribal court of appeals held that a tribal
trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action brought by
the Navajo Tribe against non-Indian corporations on the reservation. Navajo Tribe v.
Orlando Helicopter Airways, Navajo Ct. App. (Jan. 12, 1972). The case is not officially reported, but is the subject of a note in 18 ST. Louis LJ.461 (1974).
83. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). McClanahan involved Arizona's attempt to impose its
personal income tax on a reservation Indian whose entire income derived from reservation sources. The court held the tax unlawful as an interference with matters secured to the tribe and the federal government by treaty. See Note, State Taxation of
Indians-FederalPreemption of Taxation Against the Backdrop of Indian Sovereignty,
49 WASH. L. REV. 191 (1973) (noting McClanahan).
84. 544 F.2d at 1014-15 (Kennedy,J.,dissenting).
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herent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward re85
liance on federal preemption.
The dissent, however, misapplied the language found in McClanahan. It is a misreading of the opinion to construe it as a rejection of the principle of sovereignty. The Court expressly stated that it
was not fashioning any new principles;8 6 it also cited cases, including
Worcester, supporting the sovereignty doctrine, which it characterized
as providing "a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and
federal statutes must be read."8 7 The Court concluded that because
federal treaties and statutes nearly always define jurisdictional boundaries, the issue of residual Indian sovereignty is "now something of a
moot question. 88s In the Oliphant situation, however, the question
was not moot because no federal statute expressly limits tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
The principal function of the preemption doctrine has been to restrain state intrusion into Indian affairs. In Bryan v. Itasca County,89 the
Court characterized the preemption analysis as drawing support from
"the policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control" 90 and from the view that "state laws generally are not applicable
to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has
expressly provided that State laws shall apply." 9 ' Indeed, courts have
normally applied the preemption doctrine only to limit state action,
thereby preserving a measure of tribal autonomy.9 2 It would seem
85. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973).
86. 411 U.S. at 168-69.
87. Id. at 172.
88. Id.at 172n.8.
89. 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (county had no authority to tax a mobile home owned
by an Indian on the reservation because the federal statute extending state civil jurisdiction to the reservation did not mention authority to tax).
90. Id. at 376 n.2 (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 168 (1973)).
91. Id. (quoting McClanahan y.Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71
(1973)).
92. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (county had no authority under
Public Law 280 to impose its personal property tax on a mobile home owned by an
Indian and located on the reservation); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (Court applied the McClanahan preemption analysis to
prevent state taxation of cigarette sales by tribal members to Indians residing on the
reservation); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over adoption in which all parties are tribal members; if state jurisdiction had
ever existed, it was preempted by the creation of tribal courts pursuant to the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934). The Fisher court used language consistent with the
Oliphant view that tribal sovereignty is limited only by express withdrawal. "No federal statute sanctions this interference with tribal self-government." Id. at 388. One
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anomalous to apply the doctrine to limit tribal sovereignty. Thus, the
policy advanced by the development of preemption analysis actually
supports the result reached in Oliphant.
Moreover, the McClanahan Court expressly distinguished "situations involving non-Indians" as being governed by the test, established
in Williams v. Lee,93 of whether state action "infringed on the right of
94
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."
That test was developed to resolve conflicts between the state and the
tribe where both could fairly claim an interest in asserting jurisdiction;
it provides that a state may protect its interest so long as tribal selfgovernment would not be affected. 95 While the "infringement test"
does not apply in a federal-tribal jurisdictional conflict under section
1152, it could be relevant where the state claims jurisdiction under the
McBratney-Draper rule. The Williams infringement test, however,
would seem automatically satisfied when the issue is one of tribal
criminal jurisdiction over acts committed in Indian country. The right
to self-government is necessarily infringed by the inability to maintain
law and order on the reservation. Indians cannot really "make their
own laws and be ruled by them" when they have no control over behavior on their own reservation. Thus, the potential applicability of
the infringement test to a denial of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, as well as the underlying rationale of the preemption doctrine,
effectively refutes the dissent's argument that McClanahan's "federal
preemption" theory applied to limit the use of the inherent sovereignty
doctrine in Oliphant.
III.

CONCURRENT FEDERAL-TRIBAL JURISDICTION
UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1152.

Section 1152, which extends general federal criminal jurisdiction to
commentator has summarized the meaning of the above cases: "The recent Supreme
Court cases stand for the proposition that federal legislation is to be examined to
ascertain the congressional intent to preserve tribal self-government and that state
jurisdiction is therefore precluded unless expressly authorized." Lynaugh, Developing
Theories of State Jurisdiction over Indians: The Dominance of the Preemption Analysis, 38 MONT. L. REV. 63, 92 (1977).
93. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
94. 411 U.S. at 179 (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)). The
Williams decision limited jurisdiction in reservation-based contract cases exclusively
to tribal courts. The "infringement test" has been extended to reservation-based torts.
See Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 482, 161 N.W.2d 704 (1968).
95. 411U.S. at179.
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Indian country, does not expressly characterize federal juiisdiction as
either exclusive or concurrent.9 6 The dissenting judge in Oliphant
claimed that the section carries an implication of exclusivity because
it exempts from federal jurisdiction crimes by Indians against Indians
and crimes by Indians who have already been punished by the law of
the tribe. 9 7 The language of the statute, however, is more consistent
with the view that the statute extends concurrent federal jurisdiction
to all crimes not expressly reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
tribes.9 8 Moreover, the latter view is supported by the well-established
principles that Indian tribes retain all attributes of sovereignty except
those which have been expressly limited, 99 and that "legislation
affecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest."1 00
A.

Legislative History of the Statute

The legislative history of section 1152 itself indicates congressional
contemplation of concurrent federal-tribal jurisdiction. 101 The debates
and committee reports preceding the enactment of an earlier version
of section 1152, the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834,102 indicate
96. See note 39 supra.
97. 544 F.2d at 1017-19 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
98. The words "sole and exclusive" in the statute, see note 39 supra, do not apply
to the federal jurisdiction extended over the Indian country, but are used only in the
description of the laws that are extended to it. Ex parte Wilson, 140 U.S. 575 (1891);
Ex parte Nowabbi, 60 Okla. Crim. 111, 61 P.2d 1139 (1936).
99. See note 2 supra; notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
100. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599 (1916). Accord, Squire v. Capoeman,
351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Choate v. Trapp, 244 U.S. 665, 675 (1912); Santa Rosa
Band of Indians v. King County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975).
101. An early version of § 1152, the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, ch. 161,
4 Stat. 729, was one of three companion bills intended to set up a comprehensive
scheme of Indian administration. The legislative history for all three bills is found in
H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1834). One of the other bills was an act
to establish a western Indian territory. The Intercourse Act and the Western Territory
Bill were evidently conceived as complementary pieces of legislation, although the
latter was never enacted. The committee report stated, "Although they are not so connected as to render it absolutely necessary that they should be passed contemporaneously, yet, as parts of a system, it is very desirable that they should so pass, and
during the present session." Id. at 23.
The strength of the evidence for concurrent jurisdiction is somewhat altered by the
fact that these remarks were made in contemplation of the establishment of a vast
"Indian Territory," in which non-Indians would have notice of tribal jurisdiction.
However, an amendment to the Intercourse Act provided for Indian agents "until a
Western Territory shall be established." Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729,
734. That amendment indicates that the bill was intended to establish the kind of
concurrent jurisdiction contemplated in the debates over the Western Territory bill.
102. Act ofJune 30, 1834, ch. 161,4 Stat. 729.
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that the Act was designed to confer concurrent jurisdiction. First, the
House Report on the proposed legislation stated that, at least with
respect to non-Indians residing in Indian country, the tribes were to
have concurrent jurisdiction. 10 3 Second, a companion bill for the establishment of a western Indian territory included a provision that
whenever the tribe convicted a non-member and sentenced him to
04
death, the governor would have power to suspend the execution.
This provision demonstrates that tribal jurisdiction was not to be limited to members of the tribe.' 0 5 Third, an objection to the possibility
of double jeopardy by John Quincy Adams during a congressional
debate' 0 6 is meaningful only if the Indians were meant to retain concurrent jurisdiction. Finally, the Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, appended to the House Report, stated that the proposed
Intercourse Act could be enacted "without impairing in the least the
independence of a tribe within its own limits."

10 7

Indeed, there is evi-

dence that the legislators considered such concurrent jurisdiction only
a temporary measure to be adopted until the tribes were capable of
08
assuming exclusive jurisdiction.
The court in Oliphantthus felt convinced that section 1152 was not
intended to prohibit tribal prosecution of non-Indians for offenses
committed on the reservation: "Section 1152 can be explained more
rationally as an attempt to protect Indian tribes, who had no estab103. The report stated: "As to those persons not required to reside in the Indian
country, who voluntarily go there to reside, they must be considered as voluntarily
submitting themselves to the laws of the tribe." H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong.. 1st
Sess. 18 (1834).
104. Id. at 36-37.
105. The House report, in providing for a federal check on improper acts of a
proposed federal confederation, promised: "This, and the pardon of offenders in capital cases, are the only instances in which the political power of the United States will
interfere with that of the tribes, or of the confederation." Id. at 19-20.
106. Adams objected to the effect of the proposed legislation: "The bill created a
double jurisdiction; it rendered a man liable to be punished twice for the same offense: for one and the same act might be an offense against both codes of law." 10
CONG. DEB. 4771 (1834).
107. The Commissioner's report detailed the expected effect of the provision:
"Within these limits the municipal laws of the tribes may be enforced; and should the
laws of the tribes and the laws of the United States give concurrent remedies, this
would create no difficulty." H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1834).
108. The House Report stated:
[I] t is rather of courtesy than of right that we undertake to punish crimes committed in that territory by and against our own citizens. And this provision is retained principally on the ground that it may be unsafe to trust to Indian law in
the early stages of their Government.
Id. at 14.
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lished legal system and whose authority was frequently challenged by
unsympathetic state governments.' 0 9
B.

Double Jeopardy

The Oliphant court did not elaborate on the nature of the concurrent jurisdiction established by section 1152. The ordinary kind of
concurrent jurisdiction occurs when two tribunals have jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and both may apply the same substantive
law." 0 The other type of "concurrent" jurisdiction arises when an act
or omission constitutes a crime under two separate governmental systems."' The Supreme Court has ruled that, in such a case, the
defendant may be successively prosecuted and punished by both governments. 1 2 Section 1152 creates the latter kind of concurrent jurisdiction because an offense under the federal statute may also be a
violation of tribal law. In that situation, the two court systems might
apply different law to the same set of facts.
If federal-tribal jurisdiction is analogized to federal-state jurisdiction, the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy would
not protect a non-Indian defendant in federal court who had been
convicted in tribal court on the same set of facts, because the Supreme
Court has ruled that the fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition
applies only to successive prosecutions by "arms of the same sovereign."'" 3 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, has
concluded that the fifth amendment prohibits presecution in a federal
court once the defendant has been tried and convicted in a tribal court
for the same or a lesser included offense. In United States v. Wheeler,
109.
110.

544F.2datloll.
This type of concurrent jurisdiction applies to actions brought in federal court

on the grounds of diversity of citizenship, where there is federal-state concurrent jurisdiction, but the federal court will apply state substantive law. See, e.g., Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 90 (1958); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
111. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this concept as applied to state and
federal governments. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)

(" [An] act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each").
112. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (unsuccessful federal prosecution
for robbery of a federally insured bank was not a bar to state prosecution for robbery); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (conviction under state law for
making, transporting, and selling intoxicating liquors was not a bar to prosecution for
the same acts under the federal prohibition law).
113. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377 (1922).
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the court held that tribal courts and federal courts are not arms of
separate sovereigns for double jeopardy purposes. 11 4 If this decision is
followed, the fifth amendment's application in federal court and the
double jeopardy prohibition in the 1968 Civil Rights Act' 15 should
provide a non-Indian defendant with full protection against double
jeopardy in federal or tribal court.
Section 1152 expressly protects Indian defendants from double
jeopardy by providing that the section does not extend to an Indian
who has been punished by the local law of the tribe. 1 6 The absence of
a provision to protect non-Indians from double jeopardy, however,
does not imply that federal jurisdiction over non-Indians was to be
exclusive. The section was passed rapidly and almost without debate."17 Furthermore, the legislators may have been confused about
whether the fifth amendment would protect non-Indian defendants in
tribal court. Only later did the Supreme Court hold that the Bill of
Rights does not restrain tribal court actions, 118 and that the fifth
amendment provision in any case applies only to courts that are not
arms of separate sovereigns.1 19
C.

HistoricalNonassertion of Tribal Jurisdictionover Non-Indians

In Oliphant,the dissent argued that, in view of the tribes' history of
nonassertion of jurisdiction over non-Indians, congressional silence on

114. 545 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 1976) (earlier conviction of Indian defendant
in tribal court for contributing to the delinquency of a minor barred prosecution in
federal court under the Major Crimes Act for carnal knowledge of a female Indian
under the age of 16 years).
115. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) states: "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of
self-government shall . . . (3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put
in jeopardy."
116. See note 39 supra.
117. The double jeopardy provision was considered and passed after a brief explanation by Rep. Greenwood:
Thus a conflict of jurisdiction grew up, and the Senate thought proper to make
a provision to the effect that, when an individual guilty of an offense of that
character [selling spirituous liquors] and other similar, had been tried and punished in the Creek or any other nation, such trial and conviction should be a bar
to subsequent prosecution in the district court of the United States.
32 CONG. GLOBE 700-01 (1896) (emphasis added). Thus, the bill was explained in
the House as a protection for any "individual," although the bill itself referred to
"any Indian."
118. See note 31 supra.
119. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
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the matter should not be interpreted as assent to such jurisdiction. 120
As the Oliphant majority noted, that is a misstatement of the problem. 121 The dissenting judge's contention conflicts with the fundamental principles of Indian sovereignty, 122 the rule of construction
favoring Indian interests, 123 and the principle that "power and authority rightfully conferred do not necessarily cease to exist in conse1 24
quence of long nonuser."'
Indeed, there are numerous reasons for the tribes' historical failure
to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians. The disastrous policies of
removal and assimilation left their mark on tribal organization. Indians lost their land, their governments, and in some cases, the tribal
25
organization itself was terminated.
Jurisdiction over non-Indians was of little importance when reservations were usually located a considerable distance from other settlements and when few non-Indians entered the reservations. Until recently, many Indian tribes limited their jurisdiction to members by
provisions in their own codes, often adopting the model code drafted
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 26 Such voluntary limitation was
undoubtedly due in part to reliance on government advice that tribal
jurisdiction was so*limited.' 27 In recent years, however, there has
been an influx of non-Indians into Indian country, and tribal jurisdiction over non-members may now be essential to the maintenance of

120. Oliphant v. Schlie, '544 F.2d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. granted sub
nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
121. Id.at 1009.
122. See F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 146; notes 2, 32 & 33 and accompanying
text supra.

123. See note 100supra.
124. F. COHEN, supra note 14, at 125-26; United States ex rel. Standing Bear v.
Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 697 (C.C. Neb. 1879) (No. 14891).
125. See H.R. REP. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 4 NATIONAL AMERICAN
INDIAN COURT JuDGEs Assoc., JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 27-39 (1974). For
a case examining the effects of termination upon a tribe, .see Menominee Tribe of
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
126. See Barsh &;Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model Code and the Police
Idea in American Indian Policy, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 25 (1976).
127. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
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law and order on the reservation.' 2 8 Lack of jurisdiction over nonIndians should not be inferred from the tribes' failure to exercise such
jurisdiction in the past.
V.

CONCLUSION

An examination of the sources of tribal authority reveals that Indian tribes possess all attributes of internal sovereignty, except as limited by express acts of Congress or by treaty. Considered in the light
of the principle that legislation affecting the Indians is to be construed
in their interest, section 1152 does not preclude tribes from exercising
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. A recent opinion of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs is in accord: "The right of tribal self-government means more than simple freedom from the laws of others. It
means the power to govern over those matters which affect the interests of the tribes regardless of the race or political affiliation of the
1 29
party involved."'
In cases where the tribe has a functioning law and order system,
recognition of tribal jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indian offenders
would alleviate many law enforcement problems and would enhance
the quality of the independent Indian judiciary. 130 The decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Oliphant is supported both
by the historical view of the tribe as sovereign and by current policy
favoring Indian self-determination.
Kathleen A. Miller

128.
See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 1976) cert. granted
sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 97 S. Ct. 2919 (1977); I NATIONAL
AMERICAN

(1974);

INDIAN
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(1973); The Indian Civil

Rights Act Five Years Later 25-35 (Report and Evaluation by Indian Lawyers, Tribal
Council Reps., and Indian Court Judges for American Indian Lawyer's Assoc.)
(1973).
129.
130.
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Memorandum to Deputy Solicitor, supra note 57.
See D. Klein, supra note 12.

